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This paper examines preferences towards particular classes of lottery pairs. We show how 
concepts such as prudence and temperance can be fully characterized by a preference relation 
over these lotteries. If preferences are defined in an expected-utility framework with 
differentiable utility, the direction of preference for a particular class of lottery pairs is 
equivalent to signing the nth derivative of the utility function. What makes our 
characterization appealing is its simplicity, which seems particularly amenable to 
experimentation. 
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 Putting Risk in its Proper Place
The concept of risk aversion has long been a cornerstone for modern research on the
economics of risk. Ask several economists to de￿ne what it means for an individual to be
risk averse and you are likely to get several di⁄erent answers. Some, assuming an expected-
utility framework, will say that the second derivative of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function u is concave or, assuming di⁄erentiability, that u00 < 0. Others might
de￿ne risk aversion in a more general setting, equating it to an aversion to mean-preserving
spreads, as de￿ned by Michael Rothschild and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1970). It is not likely that
one would de￿ne risk aversion via some behavioral consequence, such as the propensity to
purchase full insurance at an actuarially-fair price.
Although somewhat newer, the concept of "prudence" and its relationship to precau-
tionary savings also has become a common and accepted assumption.1 Ask someone to
de￿ne what it means for the individual to be "prudent" and they might say that marginal
utility is convex, u000 > 0, but they also might de￿ne prudence via behavioral characteris-
tics. For example, Christian Gollier (2001 p. 236), de￿nes an agent as prudent "if adding
an uninsurable zero-mean risk to his future wealth raises his optimal saving." In other
words, unlike the case with risk aversion, prudence is often de￿ned via an optimizing type
of behavior, rather than some type of more primitive trait.2
More recently, some new concepts have entered the literature such as "temperance"
(uiv < 0) and "edginess" (uv > 0), which arise as necessary and/or su¢ cient conditions for
various behavioral results.3 But what exactly are these concepts and what do they imply
1about one￿ s preference towards risk?
Within an expected-utility framework, in contrast to ordinal utility, the sign of every
derivative of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u has some economic meaning.
In this paper, we derive a class of lottery pairs such that the direction of preference between
these lotteries is equivalent to signing the nth derivative of utility. The lotteries themselves
are particularly simple, involving equal likelihoods for all outcomes, which would seem par-
ticularly amenable to experimentation. Moreover, since the signs of the ￿rst n derivatives
of utility are well-known to coincide with a preference for nth-degree stochastic dominance,
our lottery preferences also are compatible with stochastic-dominance preference.
Although our results are interpreted in this paper in a context of preferences towards
risk, it turns out that they can be given other economic interpretations. The most direct
application is likely in the area of income distribution, where concepts such as "inequality
aversion" and "aversion to downside inequality" have been employed for some time. See
for example the papers by Anthony B. Atkinson (1970) and by Anthony F. Shorrocks and
James E. Foster (1987). Our results are also relevant to the literatures on the competitive
￿rm under price uncertainty, labor supply, auctions and portfolio choice.4
Justifying the sign of higher order derivatives can often meet with skepticism. For
example, Miles Kimball￿ s (1993) "standard risk aversion," which has been shown to have
many implications, is becoming a more common assumption in the literature. This con-
dition requires uiv ￿ (u000)2=u00 < 0, yet the weaker condition of temperance, uiv < 0,
typically is met with skepticism.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a set of natural conditions regarding behavior
towards risk, in the form of a preference relation between pairs of simple lotteries. In
particular, we start out by assuming that an individual dislikes two things: a certain
reduction in wealth and adding a zero-mean independent noise random variable to the
2distribution of wealth. We de￿ne "prudence," for example, as a type of preference for
disaggregation of these two untoward events. We de￿ne "temperance" in a similar manner,
except we replace the certain reduction in wealth with a second independent zero-mean
risk. Temperance is de￿ned as preference for disaggregating these two independent risks.
We then extend and generalize these concepts by nesting the above types of lotteries.
By de￿ning our set of preferences over lotteries, we provide relatively simple behavioral
characterizations of the mathematical assumption that the derivatives of the utility function
are alternating in sign: sgn u(n) = sgn (￿1)n+1 for all positive integers n. This describes
the class of so-called "mixed risk averse" utility functions, as de￿ned by Jordi CaballØ
and Alexey Pomansky (1996), a class which includes most all of the commonly used von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.5
Our "tool" in deriving these results is the utility premium, measuring the degree of
"pain" involved in adding risk. Although this measure actually predates more formal
analyses of behavior under risk, as pioneered by Kenneth J. Arrow (1965) and John W.
Pratt (1964), it has been largely ignored in the literature.6
The following section de￿nes preferences over lotteries that correspond to prudence and
temperance. We then generalize these lottery preferences to particular types of rational
behavior, which we term "risk apportionment," and show how they are equivalent to signing
derivatives of the utility function within an expected-utility framework. Finally, we discuss
how our results ￿t in with several other concepts in the literature.
1 Prudence and Temperance
We consider two basic "building blocks" for our analysis. The ￿rst is a sure reduction
in wealth of arbitrary size k, k > 0. The second is the addition of a zero-mean random
variable e ", where e " is assumed to be non-degenerate and to be independent of any other
3random variables that may be present in an individual￿ s initial wealth allocation. We let x
denote the individual￿ s initial wealth, where x is arbitrary in size, x > 0. We assume x is
non-random for simpli￿cation, although initial wealth may be random so long as a random
e x is statistically independent of e ". We also assume that random wealth is constructed in
such a way as to have its support contained within a range of well-de￿ned preferences.7
In order to avoid mathematical nuances, we only consider weak preference relations in
this paper.8 For any two lotteries A and B, we use the notation B < A to denote the
individual￿ s preference relation "lottery B is at least as good as lottery A."
We de￿ne preferences as monotonic if x < x ￿ k 8x and 8k. We de￿ne preferences
to be risk averse if x < x + e " 8x and 8e ". While not necessary for our de￿nition of risk
aversion, one usually thinks of monotonicity as jointly holding. However, it is certainly
possible to desire as little wealth as possible and still be risk averse.
To keep the notation consistent, de￿ne the "lottery" B1 as B1 = [0;0] and the "lottery"
A1 as A1 = [￿k;￿k], where all simple lotteries are assumed to have an equal probability
for each outcome. Similarly, de￿ne the "lotteries" B2 and A2 as B2 = [0;0] and A2 = [e ";e "].
Thus, we can de￿ne preferences as being monotone if B1 < A1 and as being risk averse if
B2 < A2 for all initial wealth levels x and for all k and all e ".
1.1 Prudence
Prudence is de￿ned within expected-utility con￿nes by Kimball (1990), who shows it is
analogous to a precautionary-savings motive in a particular type of consumption/savings
model. We de￿ne prudence in this paper as a type of natural preference over simple
lotteries. Later, we will show how this de￿nition coincides with Kimball￿ s characterization.9
De￿nition 1: An individual is said to be prudent if the lottery B3 = [￿k; e "] is preferred
to the lottery A3 = [0; e "￿k], where all outcomes of the lotteries have equal probability, for
4all initial wealth levels x and for all k and all e ".
Thus, prudence shows a type of preference for disaggregation of a sure loss of size k and
the addition of a zero-mean random variable e ". If preferences are also monotonic and risk
averse, the individual prefers to receive one of the two "harms" for certain, with the only
uncertainty being about which one is received, as opposed to a 50-50 chance of receiving
both "harms" simultaneously or receiving neither. Borrowing terminology from Kimball
(1993), the above property implies that ￿k and e " are "mutually aggravating" for all initial
wealth levels x and for all k and all e ".
We also can interpret prudence as type of "location preference" for one of the harms
within a lottery. In particular, consider the lottery [0; ￿ k]. Now suppose the individual
is told that she must accept a zero-mean random variable e ", but she only must receive
it in tandem with one of the two lottery outcomes. The prudent individual will always
prefer to attach the risk e " to the better outcome 0, rather than to the outcome ￿k. This
characterization already has been noted by Louis Eeckhoudt, et al. (1995) and essentially
follows from the earlier work of Hanson and Menezes (1971). In a sense, we are more
willing to accept an extra risk when wealth is higher, rather than when wealth is lower.
Indeed, this logic helps to explain why someone opts for a higher savings when second
period income is risky in a two-period model. The resulting higher wealth in the second
period helps one to cope with the additional risk, exactly as in Kimball (1990), who uses
prudence as equivalent to a precautionary demand for savings.10
1.2 Temperance
We now add a second zero-mean random variable. Let e "1 and e "2 denote these two zero-
mean random variables. We assume that e "1 and e "2 are statistically independent of each
other as well as independent from other random variables that might be owned by the
5individual.
De￿nition 2: An individual is said to be temperate if the lottery B4 = [e "1; e "2] is
preferred to the lottery A4 = [0; e "1 + e "2], where all outcomes of the lotteries have equal
probability, for all initial wealth levels x and for all e "1 and e "2.
Thus, temperance shows a type of preference for disaggregation of the two independent
zero-mean random variables. Temperance, as de￿ned above, also can be interpreted as a
type of location preference for adding a second independent zero-mean risk to the lottery
[0; e "2]. Suppose the individual must accept a second zero-mean random variable e "1, but
she only must receive it in tandem with one of the two lottery outcomes. The temperate
individual will always prefer to attach the second risk e "1 to the better outcome 0, rather
than to the worse outcome e "2. This means that we must dislike the risk e "1 more in the
presence of e "2. The risks e "1 and e "2 are "mutually aggravating" in the terminology of
Kimball (1993).
2 Generalizing Prudence and Temperance
Let fe "ig denote an indexed set of zero-mean non-degenerate random variables, i = 1;2;3;:::,
where we assume that the e "i are all mutually independent and that the e "i are also inde-
pendent of any existing risks in an individual￿ s wealth. We assume throughout this paper
that all lotteries have equally-likely outcomes. We now generalize the concepts of prudence
and of temperance as a type of preference for disaggregation of the "harms" ￿k and e "i.
2.1 Risk Apportionment
If C denotes a lottery, we can think of this lottery as essentially de￿ning a random variable.
In particular, the lottery C generates a probability distribution over wealth outcomes. As
a matter of notation, if e y denotes a random variable that is independent of C , we let e y+C
6denote the sum of the random variables.11
As a matter of terminology, we will say that preferences satisfy risk apportionment
of order 1 if they are monotonic, i.e. if B1 < A1. If preferences are risk averse, so that
B2 < A2, we say that preferences satisfy risk apportionment of order 2. In a similar
manner we de￿ne risk apportionment of order 3 as the equivalence of prudence, B3 < A3,
and risk apportionment of order 4 as the equivalent of temperance, B4 < A4. To de￿ne
risk apportionment of higher orders, we proceed iteratively.12
2.1.1 Risk Apportionment of orders 5 and 6
We de￿ne risk apportionment of order 5, RA-5, as follows:
De￿nition 3: Assume that outcomes of the lotteries below all have equal probability.
Preferences are said to satisfy risk apportionment of order 5 if, for all initial wealth levels
x and for all k, e "1, e "2 and e "3, the lottery B5 = [0+A3; e "2 +B3] is preferred to the lottery
A5 = [0 + B3; e "2 + A3]. Preferences satisfy risk apportionment of order 6 if the lottery
B6 = [0 + A4; e "3 + B4] is preferred to the lottery A6 = [0 + B4; e "3 + A4].
This de￿nition does not require risk apportionment of lower orders. But if we have risk
aversion, then we know that 0 < e "2, and if we have prudence, then we know that B3 < A3.
We can thus interpret risk apportionment of order 5 as a preference location for adding
the risk e "2: Given that we must add e "2 to one of the outcomes in the lottery [B3; A3], we
would prefer to add it to the better outcome B3. Similarly, if we have risk aversion, then
we know that 0 < e "3, and if we have temperance, then we know that B4 < A4. We also
can interpret risk apportionment of order 6 as a preference location for adding the risk
e "3: Given that we must add e "3 to one of the outcomes in the simple lottery [B4; A4], we
would prefer to add it to the better outcome B4. We illustrate A6 and B6 and how they
relate to risk apportionment of order 6 in Figure 1. Risk apportionment of order 5 is easily
7illustrated in a similar manner.
Figure 1: Risk Apportionment of Order 6, B6 < A6
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Assuming reduction of compound lotteries, it is trivial to verify that k, e "1 and e "2 are
all interchangeable wherever they appear in lotteries A5 and B5. Likewise, we can replace
￿k with e "3 in any formulation of A5 and B5 to obtain A6 and B6 respectively.
2.2 Risk apportionment of order n
Given the de￿nitions B1 = B2 = [0], A1 = [￿k] and A2 = [e "1] we can iterate on the
de￿nitions above to de￿ne risk apportionment of order n. First, we de￿ne the appropriate
lotteries:
De￿nition 4: Assume that the outcomes of all lotteries Ai and Bi as listed here have
equal probabilities. Further assume that k > 0 and that all e "i are mutually independent
with a zero mean. Let Int(y) denote the greatest-integer function, i.e. the greatest integer
not exceeding the real number y. Then for each n ￿ 3 we de￿ne the following lotteries:
An = [0 + Bn￿2; e "Int(n=2) + An￿2]:
8Bn = [0 + An￿2; e "Int(n=2) + Bn￿2].
We now can de￿ne risk apportionment for the general case:
De￿nition 5: Preferences are said to satisfy risk apportionment order n if, for the
lotteries An and Bn as de￿ned above, the individual always prefers Bn: Bn < An.
For example, suppose that we start from the lottery [0; e "4], and are told that we must
add A6 to one outcome and add B6 to the other outcome, where A6 and B6 are as illustrated
in Figure 1. Risk apportionment of order 8 would indicate a preference for attaching the
more preferred lottery B6 to the less preferred outcome e "4.
3 Utility Equivalence
In this section, we show how risk apportionment coincides with very particular conditions
on the utility function, u, within an expected-utility framework. We assume that u is
continuously di⁄erentiable over the domain of wealth. The approach we use here is quite
a direct use of the utility premium. Lottery B is preferred to lottery A if and only if it
causes less pain when added to any initial wealth level x. Since all of our risks are assumed
to be mutually independent as well as independent of any risks inherent in initial wealth,
it would not matter if we allowed ~ x to be random. For the sake of simplicity, we only
consider nonrandom x values below.13
3.1 Some Properties of the Utility Premium
Let f~ "ig denote an indexed set of mutually-independent zero-mean random variables. We
assume that each ~ "i is a non-degenerate random variable, i.e. ~ "i has a non-zero variance.
9We de￿ne the utility premium for the risk ~ "1 at wealth level x as
(1) w1(x) ￿ Eu(x + ~ "1) ￿ u(x).
Note that we de￿ne the utility premium as the gain in expected utility from adding the
zero-mean risk ~ "1 to wealth x.14
By our de￿nition, the utility premium is negative if and only if preferences are risk
averse,
(2) w1(x) ￿ Eu(x + ~ "1) ￿ u(x) ￿ 0 8x if and only if u00 ￿ 0:
Similarly, it follows trivially from Jensen￿ s inequality that
(3) w0
1(x) ￿ Eu0(x + ~ "1) ￿ u0(x) ￿ 0 8x if and only if u000 ￿ 0
and
(4) w00
1(x) ￿ Eu00(x + ~ "1) ￿ u00(x) ￿ 0 8x if and only if uiv ￿ 0.
Thus we see that w1 as de￿ned here is increasing and concave whenever u000 ￿ 0 and
uiv ￿ 0. In other words, w1 exhibits the properties of a risk-averse utility function on its
own. Of course these properties coincide with prudence and temperance in the expected-
utility literature. We next show that they are equivalent to our de￿nitions of prudence and
temperance from the previous section.
103.2 Prudence and Utility
Condition (3) is equivalent to our de￿nition of prudence, since we can allow our sure
reduction in wealth, ￿k, to be arbitrarily small. Note that from (1) - (3) above, it follows
that prudence, u000 ￿ 0, is equivalent to each of the following:
(i) Adding ~ "1 to a higher wealth level is "less painful" (i.e. the absolute size of
the utility premium is decreasing in x).
(ii) Adding ~ "1 to wealth increases the expected marginal utility.
Kimball (1990) noted both of these properties and used them to model precautionary
savings. In his set-up, an income risk is added in the second of two periods. This induces
the individual to shift some nonrandom wealth to the second period (via more savings in
the ￿rst period) in order to help mitigate the pain.
From (i) above and inequality (4), if we also have prudence, we can interpret uiv ￿ 0
as implying that the pain from adding ~ "1 to wealth decreases as one gets wealthier, but it
decreases at a decreasing rate. We next show that uiv ￿ 0 is equivalent to our de￿nition
of temperance.
3.3 Temperance and Utility
Let ~ "2 be a zero-mean risk that is independent of ~ "1. We iterate on the above procedure
for de￿ning the utility premium, and de￿ne w2 as the utility premium for w1 (regardless
of whether or not w1 is increasing or concave):
(5) w2(x) ￿ Ew1(x + ~ "2) ￿ w1(x).
If w1 is concave, then w2 will be everywhere negative. From (4), this implies that
(6) w2(x) ￿ Ew1(x + ~ "2) ￿ w1(x) ￿ 0 8x if and only if uiv ￿ 0.
11Using only Jensen￿ s inequality, in a manner similar to w1, we can continue to ￿nd
(7) w0
2(x) ￿ Ew0
1(x + ~ "2) ￿ w0




1(x + ~ "2) ￿ w00
1(x) ￿ 0 8x if and only if uvi ￿ 0.
To see that uiv ￿ 0 is equivalent to temperance, use (1) to expand (6). It follows that
uiv ￿ 0 is equivalent to
(9) [Eu(x + ~ "1 + ~ "2) ￿ Eu(x + ~ "2)] ￿ [Eu(x + ~ "1) ￿ u(x)] ￿ 0
or equivalently
(10) 1
2[Eu(x + ~ "1) + Eu(x + ~ "2)] ￿ 1
2[u(x) + Eu(x + ~ "1 + ~ "2)].
Inequality (10) is clearly an expected-utility equivalent to our lottery-preference de￿nition
of temperance (De￿nition 2).
3.4 Risk Apportionment of Orders 5 and 6
We can use w2 to show that risk apportionment of order 5 (RA-5) is equivalent to uv ￿ 0
by once again noting that our De￿nition 3 allows for the sure reduction in wealth ￿k to
be arbitrarily small. Equivalently, we can write (7) as
(11) [Ew1(x + ~ "2) ￿ w1(x)] ￿ [Ew1(x ￿ k + ~ "2) ￿ w1(x ￿ k)] ￿ 0.
12Expanding w1 in (11) and rearranging shows that it is equivalent to the lottery-preference
de￿nition for RA-5 (De￿nition 3).
To show that risk apportionment of order 6 is equivalent to uvi ￿ 0, we need to iterate
once again on the utility premium and de￿ne
(12) w3(x) ￿ Ew2(x + ~ "3) ￿ w2(x),
where ~ "3 is a zero-mean risk independent of ~ "2 and ~ "2. Similar to our analysis above, it
follows from Jensen￿ s inequality that w3 ￿ 0 if and only if w2 is concave, which we have
already proven is equivalent to uvi ￿ 0. Expanding the inequality w3 ￿ 0 by using (1)
and (5), it is straightforward to show that uvi ￿ 0 is equivalent to our lottery-preference
characterization of RA-6 in De￿nition 4.
3.5 Risk Apportionment of Order n
One can continue on in this manner by demonstrating that w0
3 ￿ 0 is equivalent to uvii ￿ 0,
as well as equivalent to our de￿nition of RA-7. To obtain the equivalence of uviii ￿ 0 and
RA-8, we need to de￿ne w4 as the utility premium of w3. We can iterate in this manner
for any n ￿ 3:
(i) For n even, we de￿ne wn=2(x) ￿ Ew(n=2)￿1(x + ~ "(n=2)￿1) ￿ w(n=2)￿1(x). Ex-
panding this expression we can show that u(n) ￿ 0 i⁄ wn=2(x) ￿ 0 i⁄ RA-n holds.
(ii) For n odd, we use the equivalence of u(n) ￿ 0 and w0
(n￿1)=2(x) ￿ 0 and
demonstrate how this non-negative derivative is equivalent to the lottery preference for
RA-n.
This leads to the following main result, showing how risk apportionment relates to
derivatives of the utility function.
Theorem: In an expected-utility framework with di⁄erentiable u, risk apportionment
13of order n is equivalent to the condition sgn u(n) = sgn (￿1)n+1.
4 Related Concepts
Many papers have looked at the implications of signing higher order derivatives of utility in
an expected-utility framework, but very few have pinned down the meaning of these signs
in and of themselves. The advantage of risk apportionment lies mainly in its simplicity.
The fact that it is de￿ned over lottery preferences also makes it applicable outside of an
expected-utility framework. Thus, concepts like "prudence" and "temperance" can be
generalized and embedded into other frameworks for choice under risk. In this section, we
examine how our results in this paper relate to some of the extant literature.
4.1 Higher Order E⁄ects
Within expected-utility models, growth rates and elasticities are typically second-order
e⁄ects because they relate the e⁄ect of changes in an exogenous variable on a ￿rst-order
condition.15 Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is a third-order property because
it has to do with changes in risk aversion (a second-order property). Prudence is also a
third-order property, since it relates the e⁄ect of risk on a ￿rst-order condition. However,
DARA is a stronger condition than simply assuming prudence, in particular, requiring that
u000 ￿ (u00)2=u0.
In a sense, we can think of prudence itself, u000 > 0, as a pure third-order e⁄ect.
A straightforward interpretation of inequality (3) is that the "pain" of adding a risk e "
decreases as one gets wealthier. On the other hand, decreasing risk aversion implies that
one￿ s willingness to pay to remove a risk is decreasing as one gets wealthier. But this
"willingness to pay" in a sense contains too much information, since it must relate the
changing level of "pain" to the marginal valuation of paying a dollar to remove this "pain."16
14We can take this argument to higher orders. Consider the interaction of two risks, e "1 and
e "2, which is a fourth-order e⁄ect. Many authors have formulations similar to our lottery
de￿ning prudence, in De￿nition 2. For example, Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser (1987)
de￿ne preferences as being "proper" if [e "1; e "2] ￿ [0; e "1 + e "2] not for all zero-mean risks
e "1 and e "2, but rather risks that are undesirable to the individual: each reduces expected
utility of the individual when added to wealth.17 Gollier and Pratt (1996), in de￿ning the
very useful concept of risk vulnerability, essentially look at this same lottery preference,
but where one of the risks, say e "2, is restricted to the set of risks that are undesirable
for all risk-averse individuals, which implies e "2 has a non-positive mean. Kimball, de￿nes
standard risk aversion in much the same manner, but where e "2, is restricted to the set of
risks that increase marginal utility. Naturally, temperance is a necessary condition for both
of these formulations, since they both include zero-mean risks e "1 and e "2 as a special case.
By allowing for non-zero means, all of these formulations include e⁄ects of other orders,
and do not isolate the pure fourth-order e⁄ect of temperance.18
4.2 Stochastic Dominance
One obvious related area is that of stochastic dominance. Stochastic dominance establishes
a partial ordering of probability distributions for which it is well known that wealth distri-
bution F dominates wealth distribution G in the sense of nth-order stochastic dominance
if and only if everyone with a utility function u for which sgn u(j) = sgn (￿1)j+1 for
j = 1; 2; :::;n prefers F to G. 19 Such a utility function is said to satisfy stochastic-
dominance preference of order n. Hence, from our Theorem it follows that preferences
satisfy stochastic-dominance preference of order n if and only if they satisfy risk appor-
tionment of order j for all j = 1; 2; :::;n.
Steinar Ekern (1981) limits the distributions F and G to those for which F dominates
15G by stochastic dominance of order n, but not for any orders less than n. In this case,
he says that G has more nth degree risk than F. He then shows how this condition is
equivalent to saying that every individual with sgn u(n) = sgn (￿1)n+1 would prefer F to
G. He labels such an individual as "nth degree risk averse." Obviously then, it follows from
our Theorem that Ekern￿ s nth degree risk aversion is equivalent to preferences satisfying
risk apportionment of order n.
Given the comments above, it is clear that others have already characterized the signs
of the derivatives of the utility function. What makes risk apportionment so appealing is its
simplicity. For instance, consider RA-4 (temperance, or equivalently uiv ￿ 0 ). For those
readers familiar with stochastic dominance, think of describing distributions where there
is stochastic dominance of order 4, but not of orders 1,2 or 3. Of course this is possible,
but it is hardly simple. Compare this to the simplicity of assuming the lottery [e "1; e "2] is
preferred to [0; e "1 +e "2].
This simplicity of our lottery design with equal probabilities, also lends itself well to
experimental design. While framing contexts and situationalism will surely still play a
role, the complexity of understanding the lottery itself is not an issue, especially for RA-n
where n is not too large. Thus, a concept like temperance seems quite plausible. On
the other hand, our de￿nition of temperance (n =4) requires that [e "1; e "2] be preferred
to [0; e "1 + e "2] for all independent e "1 and e "2. This must hold not only if e "1 and e "2 are
identically distributed, but even if, say, e "1 has a very large variance and the variance of
e "2 is extremely small. In such a setting, behaviorists might have us believe that many
individuals will be lured by the "certainty" of the ￿rst outcome in the lottery [0; e "1 +e "2],
and thus prefer it to [e "1; e "2].
164.3 Aversion to Outer Risk
Perhaps the closest approach to our own is that of Menezes and X. Henry Wang (2005),
who relate the property of temperance to the notion of outer risk. In their model, they
formally show how [e "1; e "2] ￿ [0; e "1 + e "2] implies fourth-order stochastic dominance of
the corresponding lottery distribution functions, thus equating this lottery preference to
uiv ￿ 0.20 We can generalize their notion of outer risk as follows.
In general, we cannot order e "1 and e "2, with respect to preferences. But we can construct
the chain 0 ￿ e "i ￿ e "1 + e "2, where i = 1 or i = 2. To this end, consider fe "1,e "2g as the
"inner risks" and f0;e "1+e "2g as the "outer risks." Our de￿nition of temperance (De￿nition
2) thus states that a 50-50 gamble between the inner risks is preferred to one between the
outer risks.
We can also use Menezes￿and Wang￿ s concept of inner and outer risks to describe
higher-order risk apportionment. For example, consider the simple lottery [0;e "1;e "2;e "1+e "2],
where all four outcomes have equal probability. If we must attach a sure loss of k > 0 to
either the two inner risks or to the two outer risks, RA-5 is equivalent to always preferring
to attach ￿k to the two inner risks. RA-6 can be de￿ned in a similar manner, where we
replace the sure loss ￿k with an independent third risk e "3. We can achieve all higher orders
of risk apportionment by simple iteration on these results.
5 Concluding Remarks
For a long time, risk aversion has played a key role in the theory of choice under uncertainty;
not only within expected-utility (EU) models, but also within other decision-theoretic
frameworks. It was recognized quite early on, that the sign of u000 played a key role within
EU, but it was not until Kimball (1990) that this role was formalized into the concept of
17"prudence." Since this formalization, models of consumption and savings decisions have
received a new focus and made many advancements. Outside of EU, these advances have
come mostly from trying to mimic either the consequences that follow within EU, or to
mimic some of the parametric nuances of properties such as DARA and prudence. The
role of signing higher order derivatives, such as assuming "temperance" or "edginess," is
only recently receiving more interest in the literature.
By considering simple lottery preferences, we are able to provide a characterization
of these properties based only on underlying preferences. In particular, we de￿ne such
properties by our lottery preference, and then we show how these de￿nitions are equivalent
to signing the nth derivative within EU models. Since our de￿nitions are not con￿ned to
EU, they are applicable within other choice-theoretic frameworks as well. The types of
lotteries we examine are rather simple, especially for fairly low values of n, making them
quite amenable to experiments about individual behavior towards risk.
18Notes
1The term "prudence" was coined by Miles Kimball (1990), although the importance
of the third derivative of utility in determining a precautionary savings demand was noted
much earlier by Hayne E. Leland (1968) and Agnar Sandmo (1970).
2One notable exception is the paper by Carmen F. Menezes, C. Geiss and John Tressler
(1980), who describe "aversion to downside risk" and relate it to the sign of u000.
3We use the notations u(4)(x) and uiv(x) interchangeably to denote the fourth derivative
of u,
d4u(x)
dx4 . Similarly, we denote the nth derivative by u(n) as well as by a Roman-numeral
superscript.
4A summary of results relating stochastic dominance, and hence our lottery preference,
to income distribution can be found in Patrick Moyes (1999). The other economic appli-
cations mentioned above are scattered throughout the literature, but a good overview of
many of them can be found in the book by Elmar Wolfstetter (1999).
5This property is labeled "complete properness" by John W. Pratt and Richard Zeck-
hauser (1987). This class of utility functions also was examined independently by Patrick
L. Brocket and Linda L. Golden (1987).
6One notable exception is the paper by D. L. Hanson and Menezes (1971), who more
than 30 years ago had made this exact same observation. To the best of our knowledge,
the ￿rst direct look at the utility premium was the work of Milton Friedman and Leonard
J. Savage (1948).
7For instance, if preferences are de￿ned only over positive levels of ￿nal wealth, we
assume throughout the paper that all changes to wealth, be it by subtracting a ￿xed
wealth or adding a random wealth term, are chosen so as to preserve wealth to be positive.
8Strict-preference analogs follow, but require signi￿cantly more-complex modelling, with
little extra in the way of economic insight.
199John P. Bigelow and Menezes (1995) essentially show that our lottery preference as
de￿ned below is equivalent to u000 ￿ 0. Our main distinction here is to use this lottery
preference relation as the de￿nition of prudence.
10Equivalently, we can start from the lottery [0; e "] and de￿ne prudence as a preference
for attaching the harm ￿k to the outcome 0, rather than to the outcome e ".
11More formally, if Fy and Fc denote the (marginal) distribution functions of random
variables e y and C respectively, then the distribution over the sum of these random variables
e y + C is given by the convolution of these distribution functions, Fy ￿ Fc.
12We do not particularly like introducing new terminology, but one overarching goal is
to have a generalized concept that can be extended to various orders, much along the lines
of stochastic dominance. By apportioning harms within a lottery, we wish to mitigate
their detrimental e⁄ects. Hence the terminology "risk apportionment." For orders 1 and
2, this makes less sense, but we include the terminology to have consistency in our general
results. Obviously risk apportionment of order 3 is already well known as "prudence" and
"temperance" in the extant sense is equivalent in our de￿nition to risk apportionment of
order 4.
13For a random e x, we can simply replace utility u with the derived utility function
b u(y) = Eu(y + e x), as de￿ned by David Nachman (1982). It follows trivially that the signs
of the nth derivatives of u and b u with respect to y will all be the same.
14This is the negative of how the utility premium is often de￿ned, in the scant literature
on the topic. However, one very notable exception is Friedman and Savage (1948). De￿ning
it in this manner helps to facilitate our discussions that follow.
15For example, absolute risk aversion and relative risk aversion are respectively the de-
cay rate and elasticity of changes in marginal utility with respect to increases in wealth.
Note, however, that if preferences are not required to be "smooth," such as allowing non-
20di⁄erentiability of u at some wealth levels, risk aversion might also be a ￿rst-order e⁄ect,
as pointed out by Uzi Segal and Avia Spivak (1990).
16For example, the reader can easily verify that, under the common assumption of con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the level of "pain" associated with adding the risk e " is
actually decreasing in wealth, whereas the willingness to pay to remove a unit of "pain" is
increasing in wealth. Of course, under CARA, these two e⁄ects exactly o⁄set one another.
17Actually, this lottery formulation is not presented by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1997)
themselves, but rather by a reformulation of their result by Kimball (2003).
18These same arguments have been taken up to the ￿fth-order recently by Fatma Lajeri-
Chaherli (2004), who also provides a nice summary of the fourth-order concepts of proper-
ness, risk vulnerability and standard risk aversion. Her ￿fth-order e⁄ect of "standard
prudence" relates to precautionary savings in the presence of a background risk.
19See, for example, Johnathan E. Ingersoll (1987).
20They show equivalence for their more general formulation of increased outer risk. The
lottery they consider as an illustration is the same as the one we present here, with e "2
being restricted as e "2 = [￿1;+1].
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